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Abstract. In this paper we integrate two workhorse models in economics: The 
monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz and the search unemployment 
model of Pissarides. Information and communication technology (ICT) is interpreted 
as i) technical progress in the matching function of the Pissarides labour market 
search model where it is increasing the probability of filling a vacancy, and ii) as 
technical change in the production function of the Dixit-Stiglitz goods market model 
where it is increasing fixed costs and decreasing variable costs. All effects together, 
modelled as a permanent once-and-for-all ICT and Internet shock, increase the 
vacancy/ unemployment ratio, decrease the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate, 
and increase wages.  Keywords: ICT, Monopolistic competition, unemployment. 
JEL-code: O 33, E13, E 24. 
 
 
                                                           
* I am grateful to Lex Borghans, Marcel Jansen, Bas ter Weel, Hakan Yetkiner and Thomas Zwick for 
useful comments on an earlier draft. The very useful recommendations of two anonymous referees are 
gratefully acknowledged. Responsibility is entirely mine. 
   2
1.  Introduction 
 
In the 1980s labour intermediaries started to use computers in the search process. 
Profiles of searching workers were entered into computer databases, as were 
employers’ vacancies. A similar process takes place using the Internet. Public and 
private intermediaries have set up websites for job search. These measures are 
expected to improve the chances of employers and workers to find a job for given 
amounts of time or money invested into a search
1. The OECD (1997) expressed the 
hope for a higher efficiency through the Internet as follows: “…the PES
2 would need 
to become more selective in the future and focus its resources on the at-risk groups. 
This process will be helped by the extension of self-service facilities and the 
increasing application of information technologies, in particular the Internet. The 
potential of the Internet could go well beyond the listing of vacancies and job-seekers 
and hence improving information flows in that appropriate software for searching, 
matching and screening could be provided free of charge by the PES to anybody 
wanting to use these facilities. This will further reduce costs in the provision of basic 
information and matching services and free valuable staff time for in-depth work on 
identifying at-risk individuals and providing them with early treatment.”  
Based on this hope, the PESs did set up Internet search systems. The Flemish PES 
office has developed a large-scale electronic network since 1992, which appears to 
have increased the number of reported vacancies considerably (OECD 2001b cited in 
OECD 2001a). The relevant site www.vdab.be has been visited more 180,000 times in 
June 2000 alone, 140% more than in January 1999. It contains 24,000 vacancies and 
                                                           
1 See Autor (2001). 
2 PES is Public Employment Services.   3
more than 60,000 CVs and about 12,000 enterprises have a user code.
3 In addition, 
private websites play a great role. Similarly, the Portuguese public employment 
service has both novel and more traditional components. The modern feature is the 
computerised, comprehensive system of job broking, covering all notified vacancies 
and unemployed registrants (Addison, 2001). In the Netherlands
4 there is an 
integrated web-page system for all firms. Whenever a firm introduces a vacancy on its 
own website it is automatically visible on the website of the whole Public 
Employment System. The UK Government launched over 1,200 online centres giving 
public access to computers and the Internet. The Government also announced plans to 
equip and open a further 1050 UK online centres; and launched a major Department 
for Education and Employment website - www.worktrain.gov.uk - giving instant 
online access to 800,000 job and training opportunities across Britain.
5 It also 
announces that “all 300,000 job vacancies can be searched on the net – at 
www.employmentservice.gov.uk  – 24 hours a day, 365 days a year;”
6 The Australian 
Job Service has 40-50,000 vacancies open per month. In the summary of OECD 
(2001b, p.20) it is taken for granted that the Internet enhances the number of matches 
because of the great improvement of transparency.
7  
These expected improvements of chances to find a job, which caused a huge 
amount of investment because of the expectation of improving the matching, might be 
thought of as being unequally distributed when some people do not have access to the 
Internet. This problem is well understood. The UK government states that UK online 
centres aim to attract people who may feel that technology is not for them, such as 
                                                           
3 See Vercammen and Geerts in OECD (2001b) 
4 See Gelderblom (2000).  
5 See (download 04/02/02) http://www.number-10.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=1886 
6 See http://www.dfee.gov.uk/fullemployment/ from: Towards full employment in a modern society, 
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Education and Employment by Command of Her 
Majesty, March 2001. Published by The Stationery Office Limited.   4
people with basic skills needs, lone parents, people over 60, those with disabilities, 
people from minority ethnic groups and unemployed people. A recent Department for 
Education and Employment survey found that 68 per cent of professionals have used 
the Internet compared with 22 percent of the semi-skilled and unskilled workers. 
Older people and those from ethnic minorities are also less likely to have access to the 
Internet.
8 In the Netherlands
9, among all people searching for (different) employment 
in the year 2000, 25% used the Internet for their search. This is a strong growth 
compared to the 19% as of 1999, 10% as of 1998 and 7% as of 1997. Internet is used 
more the higher the education. For all groups of not working people the Internet is 
told to be an important channel of search with a strong growth of usage. Working 
people use it slightly more, 27%. Internet use is lowest among ethnic minorities. 
Numbers for search of unemployed and for matches related to the Internet are not 
explicitly given. As working people have a higher percentage (27%) than the average 
(25%), the use by unemployed people is probably lower. However, as the Internet is 
characterized as a very important channel for them it cannot be zero. The only group 
for which the Internet is not used seems to be members of the board of private firms.
10 
In the Scandinavian countries
11 2/3 of all clients of the PES use the self-search 
procedure of the Internet because an increase in transparency is expected. 
Unemployed people are the major clients of their PESs.  
In sum, there is no doubt that less skilled and unemployed people use the 
Internet a bit less than others, but it is still important for all groups. In addition, they 
can benefit from the Internet without direct access when labour intermediaries using 
the Internet help them in the search process. ‘Assisted intermediation’ for unemployed 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 See also Koning in OECD (2001b), p.325. 
8 See  http://www.number-10.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=1886 
9 See Arbeidsbureau (2001), p.167. 
10 See Volkskrant, economie, 5-2-2002, p. 16.   5
is current practice in, e.g., Germany
12and in Flanders.
13 In the latter case data banks 
linked to websites allow registered entrepreneurs to collect information about 
applicants. This applies to 60,000 of the 180,000 jobseekers in Flanders. Even the 
low-skilled unemployed then use Internet indirectly by having their data in the 
databank introduced by the PES and screened by the employers without personally 
touching a keyboard because the PES and the employers are doing this for them. 
Moreover, the online centres in the UK mentioned above are set up exactly with the 
intention to help these people. In OECD (2001b), training job seekers in the use of 
Internet – available on terminals of the PES already now - is seen as a future task for 
the PES. On the one hand this makes clear that nobody is excluded, on the other hand 
it is clear that low-skilled and unemployed use the Internet less than higher-skilled 
and employed people; but the unemployed also use the PESs relatively more who in 
turn can use the Internet to help them. 
All of the facts presented so far show several things: (i) a huge amount of 
money and time have been invested in getting the Internet work in labour 
intermediation. The investors tell in many places that they expect to improve the 
transparency and the matching, because otherwise the investments in and costs of 
using the Internet would not make sense.
14 (ii) Firms, actual and potential employees 
use the Internet but employed and higher skilled people use it more intensively. (iii) 
People with a lower inclination to use the Internet get much help because the Public 
Employment Services and the firms handle the Internet sites to bring and find their 
CVs respectively.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 Se Konle-Seidl (2000).  
12 See http://www.arbeitsamt.de/hst/services/pressearchiv/61_01.html . 
13 See Vercammen and Geerts in OECD 2001b. 
14 See in particular OECD (2001b).    6
In labour market theory this can be captured by technical progress in the 
matching function of a search model, because here the success probabilities of finding 
a job or filling a vacancy are modelled. Therefore ICT, increasing these probabilities 
and shifting the Beveridge curve, should be modelled in the matching and search 
technology of the labour market, if we want to understand the macroeconomic effects 
of ICT. All of the results presented below are not in contrast with the empirical 
literature on shifts in the Beveridge curve and the NAIRU.
15  
   Moreover, firms have also invested into computer facilities, network connectivity 
and website development in order to ease ordering inputs and selling output
16, both of 
which are implicit parts of the output production functions used in economic theory. 
The time spent on websites and similar devices as well as the costs of training 
personnel is an increase in a firm’s fixed costs, whereas the advantages of reduced 
administration costs are a reduction in variable costs. Some well-known examples
17 
include cost reductions for transfers between bank accounts, processing costs of 
transactions of British Telecom, automobile producers’ joint exchange to buy 
components, which are supposed to reduce the costs of making a car. Moreover, in the 
1980s computer facilities were at the root of just-in-time production, which also 
increased fixed costs and decreased variable costs.
18 When fixed costs are essential, 
the assumption of perfect competition has to be dropped and an imperfectly 
competitive market structure has to be assumed.
19    
                                                           
15 The theoretical result of a decrease in the rate of unemployment derived below is in accordance with 
the empirical finding that the NAIRU (Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) has decreased 
during the 1990s (see Meijers 2000 and Autor 2001 for brief summaries of the literature). We do not 
claim, however, that the entire change in the NAIRU is due to arguments modelled here.   
16 See Meijers (2000) for a brief summary of business press information.  
17 See The Economist, A thinker’s guide, Business Special, March 30, 2000. 
18 See Callen, Fader, and Krinsky (2000). 
19 Meijers (2000) relates the shift to higher fixed and lower variable costs to inflation using a Cournot 
model.   7
   In this paper we consider these aspects of ICT as once-and-for-all technical change. 
We investigate the macroeconomic effects of ICT within a framework using the 
Pissarides (1990) labour market search model and monopolistic competition 
according to the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) goods market model. We choose the Dixit-
Stiglitz model because it appears to be the most successful imperfect competition 
goods market model in general equilibrium theory as used in the fields of 
international trade, endogenous growth, regional economics and macroeconomics. 
The Pissarides model is one of the most successful in labour market theory and 
empirics. When examining ICT as a technology of search it is most straightforward to 
integrate ICT into that labour model, which has an explicit search technology. Among 
the major labour market models (see Pissarides 1998) the search model is the only one 
with an explicit search technology.  
   We investigate in a comparative-static manner how ICT in the goods market and the 
labour market changes the endogenous variables.
20 This is done in two ways: The 
comparative-static effect of each change is considered separately and then the effects 
are considered jointly to see whether or not they work in the same direction. The most 
important results are that all effects together, modelled as one
21 permanent once-and-
for-all
22 ICT and Internet shock, increase the vacancy/ unemployment ratio, decrease 
the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate and increase wages
23 although rents 
available for bargaining are reduced by technical progress in the matching function.  
                                                           
20 It is not necessary to use an endogenous growth model here. Endogenous growth models are 
preferable when a continuous flow of innovations increasing total factor productivity is considered. 
This flow, however, is an aggregate from many sectors. When the emphasis is on just one technology 
one can simplify by using the comparative static manner. In particular, ICT is assumed to have an 
impact on the matching function but other TFP growth probably does not.   
21 It is not a repeated shock as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).  
22 Of course there is continuous upgrading. The once-and-for-all assumption is simplifying in the sense 
that we do not have to add the complications of endogenous growth models.   
23 As we consider a macroeconomic model with just one skill, we do not analyse skill bias, wage 
inequality and related issues. See Acemoglu (2000), Jacobebbinghaus and Zwick (2001) and Kaiser 
(2000) and others on these aspects.    8
   In the following section we merge the Pissarides and the Dixit-Stiglitz model. In 
section 3 we analyse the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the model and 
the effects of technical progress in the matching function. In section 4 we consider the 
effects of technical change, lowering variable but increasing fixed costs of production. 
In section 5 we summarize the results, as we have partly done in the abstract.   
 
 
2.  The model 
 
Trade in the labour market
24 
  
From the Pissarides (1990) model we use the matching function mL = Tm(uL, vL ), 
where L is the labour force, i.e. the total number of employed and unemployed 
workers, u is the unemployment rate, v is the rate of vacancies and mL is the number 
of matches produced by this function. T is an efficiency parameter or the level of 
productivity in the matching process. When computers enter the labour intermediation 
process or job-search websites appear on the Internet, T is assumed to go up.
25 The 
function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, concave and linearly 
homogenous.
26 Defining labour market tightness as θ  ≡  v/u, division of the matching 
function by vL yields q(θ )=T m(u/v,1) as the probability (Poisson arrival rate) of a 
firm to find a worker for a vacancy and θ q(θ ) = Tm/u =T m(1, v/u) as the probability 
                                                           
24 Subsections are titled as in Pissarides 1990. The search part is explained in greater detail there. 
25 An implicit assumption here is that the additional hits from the Internet are not all useless. In this 
sense, mismatches have to be decreased by the Internet as well and the increase in the number of hits - 
cleaned for mismatches - have to leave us with an increased number of matches per unit of time.    
26 Pissarides (1998, p.167, footnote 15) refers to estimates of the matching function using a Cob-
Douglas functional form, which justifies the assumptions made in the text. Anderson and Burgess 
(2000) provide similar estimation results but also convincingly argue that their findings - together with 
job search by the employed - suggest interpreting empirical matching functions as a combination of a   9
of an unemployed worker to find a job. Both these probabilities are enhanced by a 
change in ICT. By implication, the expected duration of a vacancy, 1/q(θ ), is reduced 
by technical progress in the matching function and the same holds for the expected 
time an unemployed worker needs to find a job. We assume that the technical change 
is neutral. If it were augmenting uL (vL), this would mean that it works like having 
relatively more (less) unemployed people from which the employers can choose than 
having a greater number of vacancies from which workers can choose. We rather 
assume that both these effects are equally strong because computer search is equally 
well accessible for both. Firms can afford computer equipment and workers can use 
those of public libraries or labour intermediaries, which may even provide some help 
in using the computer equipment.       
   A shock is a percentage rate s at which (1-u)L employed workers loose their job by 
assumption in every period. Therefore s(1-u)L workers go from a job into 
unemployment every period. On the other hand θ q(θ )uL unemployed workers are 
expected to find a job each period. A labour market steady state equilibrium is defined 
as a situation where the numbers of workers going into and out of unemployment are 
equal and expectations turn out to be true, i.e. s(1-u)L= θ q(θ )uL. All other variables 
constant, technical progress in the matching function increases the right-hand side of 
this equation, thus contributing to a quicker process of bringing workers out of 
unemployment. Solving this equation for u yields the Beveridge or UV curve: 
 
0 / , 0 / ,
) (







u      (1) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
structural matching function and a job competition model. We do not include job search by the 
employed for the mere sake of simplicity.   10
An increase in T, increasing θ q(θ ) , therefore reduces u for a given tightness ratio. 
Multiplying equation (1) by θ  yields an equation for the vacancy rate because 
uθ =uv/u=v: 
0 / , 0 / ,
) ( /







v       (1’) 
 
An increase in T, increasing q(θ ) for a given tightness ratio, therefore reduces v. 
Equation (1) and (1’) and their shifts induced by a change in T are drawn in the lower 
right quadrant of Figure1. These two results are summarized in the following 
proposition:  
 
Proposition 1: For any given tightness ratio, ICT, interpreted as neutral technical 
progress in the matching function, decreases the unemployment rate and the rate of 
vacancies.   
 
There is no rigorous evidence until now, which would give empirical support for this 
proposition. However, the description in section 1 indicates that firms, people 
searching for work, the private and Public Employment Services as well as 
governments expect the Internet to improve the matching process. Jackman, Layard 
and Pissarides (1989) find an outward shift of the Beveridge curve of the UK for 
1968-1987 – a period before the arrival of the Internet. They attribute this to changes 
in search effectiveness, in particular a more permissive manner of the social security 
administration, changes in the public attitude towards claiming benefits and in the 
work ethic. Future econometric work will have to show whether investment and use 
of the Internet also have an impact. Blanchard and Diamond (1989) suggest that   11
changes in search behaviour – among other things – will shift the Beveridge curve. 
One such change may be the use of ICT, in particular the Internet. The authors 
attribute part of the outward shift of the Beveridge curve, which they find for the USA 
1968-84, to an increased geographical dispersion of workers and new jobs. The 
strength of the Internet - coming up much later - is often claimed to be the bridging of 
regional distances mentioned there. Coles and Smith (1996) find the same results for 
the matching function as Blanchard and Diamond (1989) – an elasticity of 0.6 for 
vacancies and 0.4 for unemployment and an outward shift of the Beveridge curve over 
time – in a time-series analysis for England and Wales from 1985 – 1993. In their 
cross-city analysis for March 1987 they find that the position of the curve also 
depends on the age of the population of the cities, the qualification of the population, 
a high proportion of manufacturing industry, and wages, which are positively 
correlated with city size. The interpretation of this latter result is that larger cities have 
thicker labour markets allowing for better and faster matching, resulting in higher 
wages, which in turn encourage more intensive search. It is one of the suspicions 
concerning the Internet in the descriptions above that it will integrate markets, make 
them thicker, and therefore allow for better and quicker matches. Bleakley and Fuhrer 
(1997) find one shift of the Beveridge curve towards lower values of u and v taking 
place around 1987-89 in the USA and they suggest a second shift saying that ‘Indeed 
the unemployment and vacancy rates from 1995 and 1996 suggest that the Beveridge 
curve is moving even further inward - to territory not explored since the 1950s.’ They 
attribute part of this shift to efficiency improvements in the matching function as we 
do in this model. Clearly, in other countries the shift has been in the opposite 
direction.
27 ICT is only one of the many forces that have an impact on the position of 
                                                           
27 See OECD 2001a, p. 18/19.   12
the Beveridge curve and therefore other effects can easily outweigh those of ICT. 
Obviously, the shift is partly due to other effects.   
Moreover, observed shifts of single values of u and v are the result not only of 
a shift in the curves (1) and (1’) but also of i) the consequences of the shifts for the 
bargaining process; ii) the shift of marginal cost curves for profit maximization of 
firms; and iii) other changes such as the effects of ICT on fixed and variable costs in 
the goods market. All of these changes are discussed in the remainder of this paper. 
 
Government and unemployment benefits 
 
The government is assumed to pay unemployment benefits z to each unemployed 
worker. The financing of this is not explicitly treated in Pissarides (1990). We show 
how this can be modelled to keep Pissarides’ results intact. Total expenditures of the 
government or unemployment benefits are zuL. It will turn out that the incentives are 
ultimately unchanged if both the employed and the unemployed pay a tax or premium 
t to finance the unemployment benefits. Revenue then is tL. From the balanced budget 
assumption we make, it follows that tL = zuL and therefore t = zu. Workers therefore 
receive w-t = w ￿ zu and unemployed net benefits are z - t = z ￿ zu. As z is considered 
to be a policy variable, the budget equation determines the value of t, whereas u is 
determined in the general equilibrium part of the model below. On the one hand it will 
follow from the model below, that a policy of a reduction of the benefit z will 
decrease unemployment. On the other hand there is the general equilibrium effect 
that, given the gross benefit z, a lower value of the rate of unemployment, u, implies a 
lower unemployment premium t.
28    
   13
Households and workers 
















i di c,  with 0 < α  < 1, on a continuum of goods with index i, ranging from 
zero to n, the (integral measure of) the number of firms.
29 The market for goods is 
assumed to have no search frictions. It is well known that this specification of 
preferences leads to a constant elasticity of the inverse demand function, α -1, and to 
relative demand of goods independent of the income earned by employed or 
unemployed persons. If the temporary utility function is discounted and integrated we 
may get an inter-temporal utility function for which it is well known from endogenous 
growth theory or the theory of optimal growth that, in the absence of a rate of 
permanent productivity growth, the steady-state value of consumption will be 
stationary and the interest rate will equal the discount rate. This seems to be the 
shortest way to determine the interest rate.
30 The problem of a household with an 
infinite time horizon then is to choose the values of ci and of savings such that the 
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& and W(0)= W0 ≥ 0, where W is current wealth, a dot indicates a 
time derivative, r is the interest rate, pi is the price of good i, and current non-interest 
income is I = (1-u) w + uz - t. The assumption here is that a household gets the wage 
w with probability (1-u) and is unemployed and gets benefits z with probability u, but 
pays taxes t in both cases. As the utility function exhibits risk neutrality there are no 
                                                                                                                                                                      
28 Policy is discussed more extensively in Pissarides (2000), Chap.9.  
29 By implication we only consider the case of a large number of firms in which no strategic behaviour 
takes place.   14
complications from the uncertainty. A second interpretation could be that every 
household is representative in the sense that the same share 1-u (u) of its members is 
(un-) employed as in the total labour force of the economy.
31  In the first interpretation 
the (ex-post) employed workers lend money to (ex-post) unemployed workers 
allowing the latter to smooth consumption under the assumption of a perfect capital 
market. In the second interpretation this happens within the households and lending 
among identical households must be zero in equilibrium. In the appendix
32 we show 
that the inverse price elasticity is α  - 1 and the interest rate in a steady state with a 
constant number of firms is r = ρ . All results henceforth are steady-state results.  
The present value, with discount rate r, of the expected income stream of an 
unemployed and an employed worker, U and E respectively, are: U = [z - zu + 
θ q(θ )(E-U)]/r and E=[w- zu+ s(U-E)]/r. E-U is the income difference an unemployed 
worker can gain by finding a job with probability θ q(θ ). U-E is the corresponding loss 
by a worker from losing his job with probability s. These two equations can be solved 
for E and U explicitly: 
 
  r zu r
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There is monopolistic competition in the goods market. Each firm produces one of the 
goods that appear in the utility function. They hire labour in the frictional labour 
market described above and sell the good to consumers. The present-discounted value 
                                                                                                                                                                      
30 Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984, p.435, fn. 5) also follow this procedure.  
31 See Pissarides (2000), section 3.4 for this interpretation.    15
of a vacancy is in terms of real output is V = [-γ +q(θ )(J-V)]/r. It consists of the hiring 
costs γ  and the net return of transferring the vacancy V into a job with value J, which 
is expected with probability q(θ ). We assume that hiring costs are identical for all 
firms.
33 As the value of the vacancy is zero in equilibrium, we get J = γ / q(θ ): the 
value of a job is equal to the vacant job costs γ  multiplied by the expected duration of 
the vacancy, i.e. expected hiring costs. When considering the firms’ hiring costs we 
must consider that the occupied job may be separated from the worker again with 
probability s. The current value of the expected value of a job therefore is (r + s)J = 
(r + s)γ  /q(θ ). These are labour costs in addition to the real wage received by the 
worker. Labour costs per worker then equal w + (r + s)γ  /q(θ ). Technical progress in 
the matching function then implies the following: 
 
Proposition 2: For a given tightness ratio, expected hiring costs and the value of a 
job are both decreased by technical progress in the matching function because the 
probability of filling a vacancy, q(θ ), is increased.  
 
Pissarides (1990) links the above to the neo-classical production function.
34 Here we 
link it to the model by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).  
   Technologies are defined by the production function xi= (li ￿f)/a, or, solving for 
labour demand, li = f + a xi , with a, f > 0.  li represents demand for labour and xi 
output per firm to produce good i, f is the fixed part and axi is the variable part of 
labour demand and 1/a is the marginal labour productivity. Due to the fixed costs this 
                                                                                                                                                                      
32 Appendices are available from the author upon request. 
33 Acemoglu (2001) considers two sectors in which firms have different hiring costs. Rents are different 
therefore and the firms with higher hiring costs have higher rents and therefore higher wages, i.e. better 
jobs.    16
production function generates internal economies of scale, i.e. unit-cost reductions 
through higher output. As all goods are assumed to be identical in the utility function 
and in the production technology, their prices and quantities will be the same.  
   Total labour demand is nli =n( f + a xi). Equating this to employment (1-u)L yields 
(1-u)L= n( f + a xi ).
35 Solving this equation we find the number of firms linked to the 
rate of unemployment as: 
 
) /( ) 1 ( i ax f L u n + − =      (2) 
 
There is a partial negative relation between the rate of unemployment and the number 
of firms: The larger the number of firms, the lower the unemployment rate (ceteris 
paribus), or the lower the unemployment rate the more firms can be in the market.  
   Present-discounted value of the firm’s expected profits
36, which has a current value 
of zero in every period in equilibrium, are defined in nominal terms as:  
Π i = 0∫ 
∞  e
-rt { p(xi)xi -W ( f + a xi ) - pγ Vi }dt     (3) 
 
W is the nominal wage rate and real hiring costs for vacancies, γ Vi, are made 
nominal by multiplying their real value with the price. The assumption is that nominal 
hiring costs are given from the labour market; monopoly pricing then has no impact 
on the value of hiring costs.  The firm maximizes profits as defined in equation (3) 
through choice of the quantity x and the number of vacancies Vi using the dynamic 
                                                                                                                                                                      
34 In Pissarides (1990) this leads to the zero-profit condition f(k) - (r+δ )k  - w ￿ (r + s)γ / q(θ ) = 0. Here 
f(k) is the output per unit of labour and δ  is the rate of depreciation.  
35 Nothing would be changed by setting L=1. However, it is easier to see where L has an impact or not 
if it appears explicitly.     17
concept of the large firm from Pissarides (2000, chap.3). The dynamics comes from 
the fact that the firm can post a number of Vi vacancies, which increase employment 
with probability q(θ ) and costs pγ Vi.  On the other hand, the firm looses workers sli. 
The expected change in employment then is  
i i i sl V q l − = ) (θ & .  From li = f + axi and dli = a dxi we get the corresponding change in 
the quantity as  
 
) / ( / ) ( x a f s a V q x i + − = θ &  
 
The current value Hamiltonian for each firm’s decision problem then is: 
 
)] / ( / ) ( [ ) ( ) ( x a f s a V q V p ax f W x x p i i i i + − + − + − = Η θ λ γ  
 
The first-order condition for the number of vacancies determines the value of the co-
state variable as marginal hiring costs:  
 
) ( / , , 0 / ) ( / θ γ λ θ λ γ q pa or a q p Vi = = + − = ∂ Η ∂  
 
The other canonical equation is  
 
λ λ λ r s aW p x p x − = − − + − = ∂ Η ∂ − & } ' { / 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
36 This equation corresponds to equation 3.2 in Pissarides (2000).   18
Insertion of λ  from the previous first-order condition and setting its change 
equal to zero in the steady state, and noticing that the price elasticity p￿x/p=α -1 this 
latter first-order condition yields
37: 
  
)] ( / ) ( [ θ γ α q s r p W a p + + =      (4) 
 
For technical progress in the matching function, equation (4) implies the following:  
 
Proposition 3: For constant wages, technical progress in the matching function 
decreases marginal costs on the right-hand side of equation (4) because the expected 
duration of filling a vacancy and therefore expected hiring costs are reduced. The 
first-order condition then requires decreasing prices or increasing real wages. 
 
In the steady state the change of employment also must be zero and therefore we get 
the number of vacancies as a function of the quantity produced: 
 
Vi= s(f + ax)/q(θ )        
 
The solution for the quantity and the tightness ratio will be derived below.  
 
Wages 
There are two sorts of rents in Pissarides’ model: there are occupied jobs, indexed j, 
where (i) employed workers do not have to search and therefore have an income rent 
of Ej ￿ U and (ii) firms do not have to incur hiring costs and therefore have a rent Jj-V. 
                                                           
37 Equation (4) corresponds to equation (3.7) in Pissarides (2000).    19
Bargaining these rents is assumed to determine real wages. This is done by choosing 
the real wage by maximising the Nash product (Ej-U)
β (Jj-V)
1-β  with β  as the 
bargaining power of workers and 1-β  that of firms, V=0, Ej=[wj ￿ zu + sU]/(r+s), U 
according to the explicit solution given above, and,  for V = 0,  Jj= γ  /q(θ )= (α /a- 
wj)/(r+s) where the last equality stems from the solution of (4) for expected hiring 
costs.  E, U and V are as in Pissarides (1990). The value for J differs from Pissarides’ 
model because we have replaced the neoclassical production function by elements of 
the Dixit-Stiglitz model: as we have increasing returns on the firm level, the value of 
an occupied job is the present-discounted value not of the average but rather the 
marginal profit from a worker gross of hiring costs. The result of the maximisation of 
the Nash product with respect to the real wage in its general form is identical to that 
of Pissarides in that workers get a share β  of the sum of the rents to be distributed: Ej-







β β + + − = ) )( 1 (  
 
Insertion of Ej-U = β (Jj-V)/(1-β ) from the general form of the bargaining result and 
J=γ /q(θ ) into rU = [z - zu + θ q(θ )(E-U)] yields rU = z - zu +θβγ /(1-β ). Insertion of 












z wj ) 1 (     (5) 
                                                           
38 This result corresponds to equation 1.18 in Pissarides 1990. Note that with β =1, the negotiation 
result would require V=J=γ /q=γ /(m/v)=0, which could only hold for v=0 without additional   20
 
The last term indicates that workers participate in the hiring costs saved on occupied 
jobs compared to vacancies. The second but last term is net marginal value product of 
labour – replacing the output-per-worker f(k) ￿ (r+δ )k in Pissarides (1990). The 
unemployment premium or tax, zu, has dropped out only in the very last step of the 
calculation yielding (5). The Pissarides approach is consistent with an explicit 
financing scheme for the unemployment benefit if both unemployed and employed 
workers have the same reduction of their gross payments w and z respectively. Then 
the difference of going from a status of unemployed to employed workers is 
unchanged and all incentives of z are essentially as in Pissarides‘ model.
40 Equation 
(5) essentially has the real wage as a function of the v/u=θ  ratio, but q(θ ) and 
technical change in the matching function do not appear in this equation. This 
equation is drawn as the BB curve in the upper right quadrant of Figure 1. Technical 
progress in the matching function then implies the following:  
 
Proposition 4: An increase in the matching probability because of technical change 
in the matching function, dT, will not shift the bargaining curve. ICT has no impact 
on the curve for the bargained wage.  
 
   This model is kept as simple as the basic workhorse models were. We resist the 
temptation to endogenize the bargaining power parameter or the mark-up, or to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
assumptions on the matching function. However, with v=0 we also have θ =0 and therefore no 
vacancies and hiring costs. Equation (5) would imply that wages equal revenue per worker as β =1. 
39 This result corresponds to equation 1.19 in Pissarides 1990.  
40 In particular, bargaining determines wages according to (5) conditional on the tightness ratio and 
output. The firm chooses output, x, or employment, f +ax, by profit-maximization for given wages. The 
intersection of (4’) and (5) then determines wages and the tightness ratio. In a model by Stole and 
Zwiebel (1996) there is individual bargaining in the firm over employment and wages simultaneously.   21
distinguish between different skills
41, or between the parameters for love-of-variety, 
scale economies and the price elasticity.  
 
3.  The Equilibrium Solution: Existence and uniqueness of the model and the 
effects of technical progress in the matching function 
 
Equations (1)-(5) determine the five variables of the model when goods produced 
serve as numéraire (p=1): u, n, x, θ  and w. Insertion of wage per worker from (4) and 
the number of vacancies into the current profit function contained in (3) allows to 
solve for the zero-profit
42- equilibrium quantity: 
 






















x        ( 6 )  
 
Using equation (6) we can calculate the labour demand per firm as  
 















Both, output and labour demand depend negatively on hiring costs and the probability 
q(θ ) because an increase in the tightness ratio increases expected marginal hiring 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Consequently wages are valid only for the employees hired, and not for the whole market as in the 
Pissarides approach.     
41 On the point of skills see Fitzenberger (1999), Chennels and van Reenen (1999) and Kaiser 
Pohlmeier (2000).    22
costs. Each firm knows that it will be separated from the worker with probability s, 
resulting in sli separations, and can fill a vacancy with probability q(θ ). A flow 
equilibrium of the firm - allowing the firm to keep the labour demand, which allows 
producing the profit maximizing output level - then requires that expected separations 
equal expected hiring, sli = q(θ )Vi. The number of vacancies the firm will post to 




Vi = f[s /q(θ )]/[1-α  +arγ /q(θ )]      ( 7 )  
 
The equilibrium output quantity of the model is directly dependent of the labour-
market parameters r and γ  and indirectly on all those having an impact on the 
tightness ratio stemming from Pissarides’ part of the model (unemployment benefit z, 
hiring costs γ , unemployment rate u, vacancies v, separation rate s, power parameter β  
and interest r). Clearly, this result is due to the fact that the firm part of the Dixit-
Stiglitz model is changed by adding hiring costs (per vacancies actually filled) to the 
wage rate: these terms, the wage and the expected hiring costs constitute marginal 
costs and therefore have an impact on the quantity, the employment and the vacancies 
posted.  





) ( / 1
) 1 (
θ γ α + −
− =    (2’) 
                                                                                                                                                                      
42 Note that if the sum of all present-discounted profits is zero, in a steady state with all terms in the 
profit function constant - except for time in the discount factor – it follows from carrying out the 
integration that current profits have to be zero.  
43 This equation corresponds to equation (3.8) in Pissarides (2000), p.69.   23
 
This is a function n(θ ). If technical progress in the matching function decreases the 
unemployment rate through a higher tightness ratio, it increases the number of firms. 
Moreover, a higher tightness ratio increases expected hiring costs, decreases the firm 
size and therefore increases the number of firms. On the other hand, for a given 
tightness ratio, technical progress in the matching function decreases hiring costs and 
therefore increases the number of firms. These last two effects are also working 
against each other in the solution for the size of the firm in terms of output and 
employment. Aggregate output can be found by multiplying the solutions for the 
output and the number of firms, equations (6) and (2’):  
 
nx = (1-u)L[α /a - rγ /q(θ )] 
 
Although there are internal economies of scale on the firm level, aggregate output has 
constant returns in the size of the economy L, and employment L(1-u) for a given 
tightness ratio. An increase in the marginal value product of labour, dα /a < 0, 
increases nx directly because it appears in the numerator but will be shown below to 
have an indirect impact on the tightness ratio, hiring costs and the unemployment rate 
u. 
Using the result for the number of firms from equation (2’), we can calculate 
the total number of vacancies from equation (7) as vL = n Vi = n(s/q)li  = (s/q)L(1-u). 
Cancelling L and dividing by (1-u) yields v/(1-u) = s/q = θ u/(1-u). This equation 
corresponds to equation (3.14) in Pissarides and can be re-transformed into equation 
(1) by solving for u.     24
The number and size of firms and the vacancies posted all depend on the 
tightness ratio. To solve the system, the next steps serve to get a second equation 
besides (5) to solve for the wage and the tightness ratio. Dividing (4) by the price and 










− =        ( 4 ’ )  
 
Larger hiring costs, (r+s)γ /q(θ ), imply lower wages according to (4’) as in Pissarides’ 
model when interest is given. Here the model resembles Pissarides’ because the zero-
profit condition in his model – rewritten in an endnote - implies constant labour costs 
as long as r =fk-δ  and therefore k are constant. By implication, for a given marginal 
value product of labour, wages w always move in the opposite direction of hiring 
costs, (r+s)γ /q(θ ), in Pissarides’ model and in ours. Equation (4’) is drawn as a 
function w(θ ) in the upper right quadrant of Figure 1, indicated as the MM curve. It is 
also drawn in the upper left quadrant of Figure 1 with wages as a function of hiring 
costs. The intersection of lines BB and MM determines the wage and the tightness 
rate in the upper right quadrant, and hiring costs in the upper left quadrant. Given the 
rate of tightness thus determined, the solution for the rates of unemployment and 
vacancies can be found in the lower right quadrant. The tightness ratio then 
determines the size and number (also via the rate of unemployment) of firms. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 OVER HERE 
   25
Technical progress in the matching function rotates the MM curve up around its 
vertical intercept, but leaves the BB curve unchanged and implies the following:  
 
Proposition 5: Technical progress in the matching function, dT>0, increasing the 
probability of filling a vacancy, decreases expected hiring costs and marginal costs, 
and increases tightness and wages. The size of the firms is increased by lower hiring 
costs. The number of firms is decreased by lower hiring costs and by the decrease in 
unemployment. The effects of a reduced rate of unemployment and lower hiring costs 
both increase aggregate output.  
 
Equations (5) and (4’) are two functions w(θ ). As the BB curve is increasing and the 
MM curve is decreasing, α /a > z ensures the existence of a unique equilibrium. Thus, 
there is only one solution or no one at all. Therefore we have a unique or no 
equilibrium. The fixed cost parameter f and the size of the economy, L, have no 
impact on the value of v/u=θ . If, however, az ≥  α , the tightness ratio is zero, there are 
no vacancies and unemployment is 100% according to equation (2). With no output, z 
cannot be paid.  Therefore this cannot be an equilibrium situation.   
Wages are increased by technical progress in the matching function, because the 
expected duration of filling a vacancy, and expected hiring costs are reduced. The 
MM curve rotated upwards because reduced hiring costs imply lower marginal costs. 
One can see from equation (5) that an increase in the tightness ratio increases wages. 
It follows from equation (4’) that increased wages imply reduced hiring costs. 
Technical progress in the matching function increases wages as technical progress 
in the production function normally does in economic theory.   
    26
4.  Comparative static analysis of technical change in the production and 
matching functions 
 
Changes in technologies towards computers, Internet connectivity and website 
technology cause increases in fixed costs - in particular labour costs. Changes in fixed 
costs, df >0, do not change the tightness ratio and therefore the unemployment and 
vacancy rates and variable labour costs are unchanged.
44 Firm size x is increased
45 and 
the number of firms is decreased as in Dixit-Stiglitz. Aggregate output, nx, is 
unaffected.    
As a consequence of these ICT changes, variable costs of ordering inputs and 
selling output are reduced. A decrease in marginal costs via da<0, shifts up the MM 
curve according to equation (4’) and, to a lesser extent, the BB curve according to 
equation (5) in Figure 1 as indicated by the arrows drawn. Wages and the tightness 
ratio, v/u=θ  are increased according to equation (5). This reduces the unemployment 
rate and increases the rate of vacancies according to equation (1) and (1’) and 
increases hiring costs. The direct effects of the increase in the marginal product of 
labour are as follows: The size of firms is increased according to equation (6) and the 
number of firms is decreased according to equation (2’) and aggregate output is 
increased. However, the resulting increase in hiring costs has the opposite effect on 
each of these variables.  
 
Proposition 6: Technical change in the production technology in the form of higher 
fixed and lower variable costs, df>0 and da<0, increases wages, the tightness ratio 
                                                           
44 Effects of changes in fixed costs may be quite different in endogenous growth models. See de Groot 
(2000).  
45 Of course, there may be other real world events, such as the shift from industry to services that work 
towards a decrease of firm size. Here we consider only the effects of ICT in isolation.    27
and hiring costs, and decreases the unemployment rate but increases the vacancy 
rate. The size of the firm
46 and aggregate output are increased and the number of 
firms is decreased by the direct effect of these changes but the increase in hiring costs 
works in the opposite direction.    
 
Note that technical progress in the matching function and in the production function 
always shift the MM curve to the right and the BB curves to the left with a stronger 
net effect of the shift to the right and the UV curve towards lower unemployment 
rates. This leads us to the following result: 
 
Proposition 7: ICT as technical progress in the matching function and in the 
production function increases the tightness ratio, decreases the unemployment rate of 
the general equilibrium solution of the model and increases wages. The fall in the 
unemployment rate implies that the unemployment premium, t = zu, can be reduced if 
the gross benefit z is kept constant. Hiring costs are decreased through technical 
progress in the matching function but increased through technical progress in the 
production function. The net effect on hiring costs is unclear. The direct effects 
increase the size of the firm and aggregate output, and decrease the number of firms. 
The increase in employment increases the number of firms and increases aggregate 
output - but an increase in hiring costs, which cannot be excluded, would work in the 
opposite direction. The effect on the vacancy rate is also ambiguous.  
 
The results for hiring costs and the size of firms follow from propositions 5 and 6. 
The result for aggregate output, nx, follows from the fact that it increases when the 
                                                           
46 See also Barras (1990) on this aspect.   28
unemployment rate and the marginal cost parameter decreases but decreases by a 
potential increase in hiring costs. The number of firms, according to equations (2) and 
(2’) is positively affected by the decrease in the unemployment rate, the increase in 
the marginal product of labour and negatively by a potential increase in hiring costs. 
An increase in the tightness ratio increases the number of vacancies but ICT shifts 
the vacancy curve to lower values. Vacancies will grow (see appendix for a 
derivation) if the effect of a change in variable costs, (-da/a), is sufficiently large, or if 
either the bargaining power of workers, β , or the probability of an unemployed to find 
a job, θ q, are small or the discount rate r and the separation rate are sufficiently large. 
In these cases the change in the tightness ratio dominates the change in the position of 
the v curve, because all of these changes are favourable for increases in the tightness 
as opposed to increases in wages.   
How does this model differ from perfect competition?  
(i)  Under perfect competition the fixed costs are zero and there is no product 
differentiation: f =0 and α  =1. Allowing for fixed costs and product 
differentiation is a gain in realism per se. Whereas changes in fixed costs f 
have an impact only on the division of aggregate output into the size and 
number of firms, an increase in the degree of competition, dα  > 0, 
increases aggregate output directly and also indirectly because it shifts up 
the MM curve and decreases unemployment, but the resulting increase in 
hiring costs counteracts this effect.   
(ii)  The introduction of fixed costs and product differentiation has two 
consequences: a) The number and size of firms is determined; b) Each firm 
produces only one product that is not produced by any other firm. By 
implication, each variant of a product will be produced only in one region   29
or country. This has helped explaining intra-industry trade and regional 
agglomeration. 
(iii)  When technical change is treated in the way that is common to industrial 
organisation literature – decreasing variable costs by increasing fixed costs 
– one needs a model of imperfect competition because competition cannot 
be perfect in the presence of fixed costs. This insight was at the heart of 
endogenous growth theory. 
(iv)  Changes in fixed costs f, and the CES parameter α , which is also the 
degree of competition, produce the same direct effects on the goods market 
as they do in the Dixit-Stiglitz model, but the latter also changes the size 
and number of firms via changes in the hiring costs. Similarly, changes in 
the labour market parameters s, z, β , and γ  produce the same labour market 
effects as in Pissarides’ model, but the also change the size and number of 
firms via changes in the hiring costs. 
     
5.  Summary and conclusion 
 
Linking Pissarides’ (1990) search theory of unemployment to the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) 
model rather than to the neo-classical production function yields a framework in 
which effects of ICT can easily be identified, which together increase the vacancy/ 
unemployment ratio, decrease the unemployment rate and increase wages. Hiring 
costs can increase or decrease.   
   First, ICT serves as technical progress in the matching function of job search. For 
any given tightness ratio this decreases the rate of unemployment and vacancies. 
When technical progress reduces expected hiring costs inspite of the increase in the   30
tightness ratio, there is more room for wages paid to households because marginal 
costs are lowered. The result of technical progress in the matching function is a higher 
tightness ratio and a lower rate of equilibrium unemployment. A higher tightness ratio 
yields higher wages and lower hiring costs.   
   Second, fixed costs increases as maintaining computers, making Internet 
connectivity and keeping websites working require trained personnel. This increases 
the size of firms and decreases the number of firms. Other variables are not affected 
by a change of the fixed cost parameter.    
   Third, the shift to higher fixed costs causes lower variable costs for ordering inputs 
and selling outputs, modelled here as production costs including the process of 
ordering and selling. This effect increases wages and the tightness ratio and decreases 
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Figure 1. The wage bargaining result, BB, and the profit maximising real wage, MM, determine the real wage 
and the tightness ratio in the upper right quadrant. This implies a solution for the unemployment rate u and 
vacancies v in the lower right quadrant. Each result for wages implies a result for hiring costs in the upper left 
quadrant. Technical progress in the matching function shifts the Beveridge curve towards the axes and MM up. 
The latter effect is supported by a decrease in variable costs.   36
 
Appendix: Household’s utility maximization (not for publication) 
The Hamiltonian for the dynamic optimisation problem of the household indicated in 
the text is  
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t e  need not be stated here 
because the differential equation for the co-state variable implies  r − = ρ λ ˆ . For any 
positive interest rate the transversality condition is redundant. The first-order 

















Therefore the inverse partial price elasticity is α -1. Multiplying the first-order 




















As all goods in the model have the same costs and therefore the same prices we set 
the prices equal to unity using them as numéraire. Quantities then also will be 
identical because goods enter the utility function symmetrically. The last equation 
then can be written as n
(1/α )-1 =λ >0. In any steady state where the number of firms is   37
constant, the co-state variable λ  must also be constant and its growth rate ρ -r must 
also be zero. Therefore r = ρ  in a steady sate with a constant number of firms.   
 
Appendix: The comparative static result for vacancies (not for publication) 
    
The ambiguity concerning the vacancy rate can be explored a bit more. By definition, 
v = uθ . In growth rates this implies  
 
θ ˆ ˆ ˆ + = u v .  
 
From equation (1) the growth rate of u can be calculated as  T u uT u ˆ ˆ ˆ ε θ ε θ + = . The 
expressions before the growth rates are the elasticities of the unemployment rate 
according to equation (1) with respect to θ  and T. Insertion of this latter equation into 
that for the growth rate of vacancies yields 
 
T v uT u ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ε θ ε θ + + =   
 
From equation (1) it is possible to derive ε uθ = ε mv/[(s/Tm)+1]>0 and ε uT=-
1/[(s/Tm)+1] < 0.  ε mv=1-ε mu is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to 
vacancies, which equals unity minus the elasticity with respect to unemployment. 
Blanchard and Diamond (1989) estimate that this elasticity has a value of about 0.6. 
Therefore  ε uθ  must be even smaller. By implication, the growth rate of the tightness 
ratio has a positive impact on that of vacancies and the growth rate of technology has 
a negative impact. Next, we try to derive sufficient conditions for the case that   38
vacancies will grow. Simple manipulation of the formula for the growth rate of v 



















Insertion of the expressions for the elasticities presented above the equation can be 
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As the first elasticity on the right-hand side is negative, the growth rate for vacancies 
can only be positive if the term in brackets is negative. This requires a sufficiently 
strong growth of the tightness ratio relative to that of T. Total differentiation of 































As ￿da/a does appear only in this last fraction and not in the formula for growth of v 
we can say that a sufficiently large change of ￿da/a, other things constant, will make 
sure that vacancies are enhanced. Next, we go on for the case da=0. Then the last 
equation can be simplified to yield 
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As the elasticity before the fraction is negative, vacancies will grow even if da=0 if 
(sufficient) βθ q/(r+s) ￿s <0. This means that the growth of the tightness ratio if large 
enough to increase vacancies if – other things constant - worker power β  is 
sufficiently small, or the probability of an unemployed to find a job, θ q, is sufficiently 
small, or the discount rate r and the separation rate s are sufficiently large.   








List of symbols (not for publication) 
 
α   marginal revenue, CES parameter  
a   marginal costs   
β   bargaining power  
γ   hiring costs 
f   fixed costs     
L   country size   
n  number of firms  
nx aggregate  output   
r   interest rate     
s   separation rate 
t  unemployment premium or tax  
θ  tightness ratio v/u  
u unemployment  rate  
v   vacancy rate  
w   wage   
x   firm size 
y   utility  
z   unemployment benefit 